Frequently Asked Questions

1. How does CryptoFed know the exact Ducat money supply needed in the economy?

At a given time, there is an optimal money supply needed for the economy. To achieve zero inflation and zero deflation (no oversupply and no undersupply), the exact money supply should always ensure the Target Exchange Rate (TER) is satisfied as illustrated at the section of DUCAT VS. THE US DOLLAR of the Home page. At crypto exchange markets, Ducat is constantly priced by USD. If the Ducat’s price is within a tolerable 2% variation of the TER, the Ducat money supply will be close to the optimal level. Both inflation and deflation can seriously hurt the economy.

2. What policy tools does CryptoFed have to adjust Ducat money supply?

CryptoFed has three policy tools:
i) Fiscal Policy defined as rewards paid to consumers at range of 5.5% -12% and paid to merchants at range of 1% - 4%

ii) Monetary Policy defined as interest paid to all Ducat holders at range of 3% - 5%.

CryptoFed will increase interest rate as high as necessary independent of the range to cure inflation or deter inflation. Interest rate increase has been proved to be an effective tool to control inflation. “Twenty-five years ago, on October 6, 1979, the Federal Reserve adopted new policy procedures that led to skyrocketing interest rates and two back-to-back recessions but that also broke the back of inflation and ushered in the environment of low inflation and general economic stability the United States has enjoyed for nearly two decades.” — FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER, Number 2004-35, December 3, 2004.

“Unbeknownst to many, last fall was the silver anniversary of a watershed moment in Fed history and the economic history of the country. On Oct. 6, 1979, Fed Chairman Paul Volcker took dramatic steps to rein in the runaway inflation that had been sapping the strength of our economy since the mid-1960s. Without his bold change in monetary policy and his determination to stick with it through several painful years, the U.S. economy would have continued its downward spiral. By reversing the misguided policies of his predecessors, Volcker set the table for the long economic expansions of the 1980s and 1990s.”  —President's Message: Volcker's Handling of the Great Inflation Taught Us Much. By William Poole, January 1, 2005.

iii) Open Market Operations defined as buying and selling Ducat at crypto exchange markets to maintain the Target Exchange Rate (TER) and keep the variation within a 2% lower and upper bound about the TER. On monthly or quarterly basis, CryptoFed will adjust the fiscal policy within the reward rate range and monetary policy within interest rate range, while Open Market Operations are conducted daily. The three policy tools will be guided and coordinated via Machine Learning and Linear Control methods. For example, Open Market Operations will be governed by the CryptoFed’s Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) controller to achieve zero inflation and zero deflation (no oversupply and no undersupply).

3. What is the relationship between Locke and Ducat?

Ducat provides fundamental value to Locke. In turn, Locke impacts Ducat in two ways:
i) Making CryptoFed’s network rules under which Ducat operates.

ii) Buying Ducat in Open Market Operations, which will reduce Ducat money supply in the short run, to deter and cure inflation in Ducat Economic Zone. With the growing adoption of Ducat among merchants and consumers, Ducat’s money supply will increase year after year. Ducat holders use Ducat to buy goods and services at participating merchants, which in turn will convert Ducat back to USD on compliant exchanges for redemption. Because CryptoFed gives away Ducat tokens, free of charge, to individuals or entities as rewards and interest in the range of 10 % – 20% additional Ducat in total for retail purchase and Ducat holding, CryptoFed must continually buy back Ducat tokens on compliant exchanges via open market operations to maintain the Target Exchange Rate between Ducat and USD. CryptoFed uses Locke tokens to conduct the Ducat buyback. In order to enable Locke to buy back Ducat on an ongoing basis, all USD pegged stablecoin proceeds from Ducat sales must be transferred to CryptoFed’s USD-pegged stablecoin reserve for Locke buyback so that Ducat holders can always redeem Ducat at the Target Exchange Rate between Ducat and USD. No proceeds can be used for other purposes. Below is the redemption flow.  

Consumer Purchase and Merchant Redemption Flow:
Purchaser => Ducat=> Merchant => Ducat => Exchange => USD => Merchant

Ducat Buyback Flow:
CryptoFed => USD-pegged stablecoin proceeds => Locke buyback => Ducat buyback 

This is the best way and the only way for CryptoFed to maintain the Target Exchange Rate and use up the USD pegged reserve whose value will continue declining against Ducat due to inflation overtime. A virtuous cycle mechanism between Locke and Ducat has been built in for automatic perpetual growth which will benefit all Locke and Ducat holders.

4. How can CryptoFed maintain the sustainability of the Ducat economy?

There are three major channels through which CryptoFed puts new Ducat into circulation: 
i) Ducat issued to users who purchase Ducat with USD pegged stablecoins. The USD pegged stablecoin proceeds must be used for Ducat redemption through Open Market Operations. No proceeds can be used for other purposes.

ii) Ducat paid to Ducat holders as interest. The interest payments contribute to retain Ducat in the Ducat economy. Also, it is certain that inflation in Ducat economy can be cured or deterred by interest rate increase.

iii) Ducat rewards and compensation paid to consumers, merchants, wallet issuers, Block Producers, States and Cities are associated with and based on purchasing goods and services at merchants. The increase of Ducat money supply through this channel results from the growing adoption among merchants and consumers. Given that Ducat’s purchase power can be preserved (no inflation & no deflation) by CryptoFed via its three policy tools, Ducat holders have no economic reasons to convert Ducat to USD. Instead, more and more USD will be converted to Ducat to enjoy the benefits provided by Ducat economy. 

iv) Regarding CryptoFed’s self-stabilization mechanism, please see FAQ No. 8. Regarding CryptoFed’s policy tools for maintaining no inflation and no deflation in ordinary course of business, please see FAQ No. 2.

“The real thing which is the subject matter of praxeology, human action, stems from the same source as human reasoning. Action and reason are congeneric and homogeneous; they may even be called two different aspects of the same thing. That reason has the power to make clear through pure ratiocination the essential features of action is a consequence of the fact that action is an offshoot of reason. The theorems attained by correct praxeological reasoning are not only perfectly certain and incontestable, like the correct mathematical theorems. They refer, moreover, with the full rigidity of their apodictic certainty and incontestability to the reality of action as it appears in life and history. Praxeology conveys exact and precise knowledge of real things.” Ludwig von Mises, page 39, 1998, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, Scholar's Edition, the Ludwig von Mises Institute

Through the methodology of praxeological reasoning, American CryptoFed’s Economics cohesively reconciles and integrates theorems established by major academic schools of economics in order to attain the apodictic certainty and incontestability of the Ducat economy's sustainability.  

5. How different is CryptoFed money supply mechanism from the Federal Reserve’s?

Lending through commercial banks is the Federal Reserve’s mechanism to put new money supply into circulation. When the absolute level of debt accumulation is too large to be paid back, the Federal Reserve’s mechanism of money supply will stop functioning. The burden of existing loan repayments will ultimately reach a level that even at a low interest rate close to zero, the borrowers cannot meet the lender’s criteria to pay back additional loans. Consequentially, no additional money can be supplied to maintain and increase effective demand for economic growth.

“THE LIQUIDITY TRAP-that awkward condition in which monetary policy loses its grip because the nominal interest rate is essentially zero, in which the quantity of money becomes irrelevant because money and bonds are essentially perfect substitutes-played a central role in the early years of macroeconomics as a discipline.” (Paul Krugman, 1998, p.137, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity)

"Ten years later my fears came true: as Figure 1 shows, with the coming of the global financial crisis the whole advanced world basically turned Japanese, experiencing a protracted era of near zero interest rates. The United States has emerged from that era, barely; Europe and Japan itself have not." (Paul Krugman, 2018, p.2-3, It's Baaack, Twenty Years Later).

The unexpected COVID-19 pandemic trigged unprecedent experiment of large-scale fiscal policy (government spending financed by deficits) which did enable advanced economies to escape from liquidity traps. However, subsequently, all these economies have entered hyper inflations. After all central banks increase interest rates to cure inflation, it is highly possible to all advance economies will go back to liquidity traps again.

Beckworth: Yeah. It's great to have you on. In preparing for today's show, I went back and looked at our previous conversation which was in 2017, and looking back now much simpler times, we were worried about liquidity traps, the unanemic recovery, safe asset shortage. We even talked about Isaac Asimov back then.

Krugman: Yeah. It is not someplace in a way it's the political economy of this has been just wild. Not at all what I would've feared, what I would've expected. Of course that's my guess is that two or three years from now, we'll be having the same discussion we were having in 2017. This is not a permanent state of affairs, but for now, at least, yeah, we are worrying about overheating, which is kind of a welcome change in some ways although problematic in others. (Paul Krugman on the Year of Inflation Infamy, MERCATUS ORIGINAL PODCASTS, January 3, 2022, The Mercatus Center at George Mason University)

Professor Paul Krugman (Nobel Laureate 2008) clearly provides an insightful picture that the existing central banking systems in advance economies are at the beginning of the end.

Furthermore, the Fed cannot increase the interest rates to control inflation, because an interest rate increase will bankrupt a lot of existing borrowers due to the additional burden of interest payments, leading to an economic and financial crisis. The fact that the Federal Funds Rate has stayed at or close to zero for about a decade after 40 years of one-way downward path since 1980, demonstrates that the Fed no longer has an effective tool to adjust money supply for inflation and deflation control. Money supply mechanism through lending has failed to establish a virtuous cycle between lending and loan repayments to perpetuate the Federal Reserve System.

In contrast to the Fed’s lending mechanism, CryptoFed’s money supply mechanism is giveaway. Ducat rewards paid to consumers and interest paid to Ducat holders are the mechanism by which the CryptoFed can put new money supply into circulation. Effective demand in the economy can be maintained and increased for economic growth, which in turn will generate more demand for additional money supply. In case there is Ducat oversupply, Ducat reward rate and interest rate can be adjusted and optimized mathematically via Machine Learning. Money supply mechanism through giveaway can establish a virtuous cycle between giveaway and economic growth to perpetuate the CryptoFed monetary system. 

By replacing the Fed’s lending money supply mechanism with the CryptoFed’s giveaway money supply mechanism, the Ducat economy presents a viable alternative to avoid the Fed’s fractional reserve banking and the necessity of FDIC. The fractional reserve banking legitimately institutionalizes the inherent and inevitable macroeconomic risks in the economy via the banking industry, periodically causing boom and bust business cycles (economic expansion and contraction) and subsequent large-scale bailout by the FDIC and tax-payer money through government intervention. This brutally impacts the American middle class through unintentional periodic and systematic financial and economic crisis.

Right after the housing bubble collapse in 2008 — symbolized by the fall of Lehman Brothers — the IMF published a report entitled "The Chicago Plan Revisited'' which validates the 100% reserve banking model for decoupling money supply function from bank’s lending function. The citation is slightly long, but it is important because it fully supports the CryptoFed’s model of decoupling money supply function from bank’s lending function. The only difference is that the CryptoFed is pursuing a denationalization of money supply mechanism, while The Chicago Plan pursues the nationalization of money supply mechanism but not banks.

“The decade following the onset of the Great Depression was a time of great intellectual ferment in economics, as the leading thinkers of the time tried to understand the apparent failures of the existing economic system. This intellectual struggle extended to many domains, but arguably the most important was the field of monetary economics, given the key roles of private bank behavior and of central bank policies in triggering and prolonging the crisis. 

During this time a large number of leading U.S. macroeconomists supported a fundamental proposal for monetary reform that later became known as the Chicago Plan, after its strongest proponent, professor Henry Simons of the University of Chicago. It was also supported, and brilliantly summarized, by Irving Fisher of Yale University, in Fisher (1936). The key feature of this plan was that it called for the separation of the monetary and credit functions of the banking system, first by requiring 100% backing of deposits by government-issued money, and second by ensuring that the financing of new bank credit can only take place through earnings that have been retained in the form of government-issued money, or through the borrowing of existing government-issued money from non-banks, but not through the creation of new deposits, ex nihilo, by banks. 

Fisher (1936) claimed four major advantages for this plan. First, preventing banks from creating their own funds during credit booms, and then destroying these funds during subsequent contractions, would allow for a much better control of credit cycles, which were perceived to be the major source of business cycle fluctuations. Second, 100% reserve backing would completely eliminate bank runs. Third, allowing the government to issue money directly at zero interest, rather than borrowing that same money from banks at interest, would lead to a reduction in the interest burden on government finances and to a dramatic reduction of (net) government debt, given that irredeemable government-issued money represents equity in the commonwealth rather than debt. Fourth, given that money creation would no longer require the simultaneous creation of mostly private debts on bank balance sheets, the economy could see a dramatic reduction not only of government debt but also of private debt levels,” — Jaromir Benes and Michael Kumhof, 2012, page 4, The Chicago Plan Revisited, IMF Working Paper

6. Why does CryptoFed use EOS protocol?

“To build an enterprise-grade financial product using blockchain with high scalability, low latency and zero transaction fee, EOS was our choice.” The article “Why we built our blockchain business on EOS instead of Ethereum” provides a great testimony. Furthermore, EOS is an open-source protocol which enables CryptoFed to build its own CryptoFed Blockchain (sister-chain).

7. Why does CryptoFed use banks and compliant exchanges as block producers? 

All individuals and business entities are required to open an account at a CryptoFed participating bank or compliant crypto exchange or organization complying with Know Your Customer (KYC), Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and money transmitter regulations. These banks, exchanges and organizations will serve as trustful block producers, certify and publish CryptoFed’s Group Treasury funds under their management for transparency purposes, issue CryptoFed co-branded wallets bearing the name of the issuers to the individuals and entities for holding and transacting Ducat and Locke. 

The co-branded wallet issuers will be paid 0.50 Ducat by the CryptoFed for every purchase transaction in Ducat made by their customers through the co-branded wallet. Furthermore, an amount equal to 10% of the total interest paid by the CryptoFed to Ducat holders will be paid by the CryptoFed to co-branded wallet issuers. These Ducat compensations are equivalent to mining revenue. 

In the long run, to further decentralize the CryptoFed Blockchain, all private entities which currently process personal information during their ordinary course of business, have expertise in KYC /AML and money transmitter regulations, and are already required to protect personal information, can serve as block producers. These entities include, but are not limited to, banks, credit unions, universities, insurance companies, airlines, pharmacies, utility companies, retail merchants issuing private card programs, etc.

8. How different is CryptoFed (Locke/Ducat) from other two-token models, such as TerraProtocol (Luna/TerraUSD) and Maker Protocol (MKR/DAI)?

CryptoFed (Locke/Ducat) has three unique characteristics which other two-token protocols do not have.

i) Money Supply Mechanism Tied to Purchasing Goods and Services
Ducat money supply through rewards and compensation paid to consumers, merchants, wallet issuers, States and Cities is associated with and based on purchasing goods and services at merchants and the service providers. This money supply mechanism ensures that Ducat can directly purchase goods and services at these merchants and service providers without conversion to US dollar. The stability of Ducat comes from this purchasing power. None of the other two-token models have an equivalent mechanism design for money supply.

ii) Floating Exchange Rate between Ducat and US Dollar as a Self-Stabilization Mechanism
The actual daily exchange rate on crypto exchange markets may constantly fluctuate around the Target Exchange Rate. CryptoFed’s open market operations will ensure the variation will not go beyond a 2% range of upper and lower bounds. However, during crisis, the Ducat price against US dollar may fall sharply and far below the Target Exchange Rate. As long as consumers can purchase goods and services at merchants and service providers at the same price in Ducat independent of the sharp Ducat depreciation, consumers will buy more Ducat rather than fleeing from Ducat, because fleeing from Ducat means exchange rate loss and buying Ducat for purchasing goods and services of daily life means exchange rate gain. The larger the difference between the Target Exchange Rate and actual exchange rate during a sharp Ducat depreciation, the larger Ducat amount consumers will buy. As a result, the Ducat price against US dollar will be supported by consumers and will recover gradually, given that CryptoFed will, simultaneously and automatically increase Ducat interest rate for encouraging saving (monetary policy) and reduce Ducat reward for purchasing goods and services (fiscal policy) during the crisis.

iii) Exchange Rate Loss of Merchants and Service Providers Covered by CryptoFed
In order to ensure that merchants and service providers accept Ducat and maintain the same price Ducat during crisis, CryptoFed will make up the difference in Ducat between the Target Exchange Rate and actual exchange rate automatically via smart contract for merchants and service providers. As a result, merchants and service providers will be protected from exchange rate loss, while consumers will be subject to exchange rate loss for conversion from Ducat to US dollar.

iv) Mundell-Fleming Model Regulating the Equilibrium of Two Economic Zones
The design of the three unique characteristics which collectively maintain a self-stabilization mechanism, was guided by Mundell-Fleming model which defines, from the perspective of international economy, the relationship between two economic zones of independent currencies, such as the relationship between Ducat Economic Zone and US Dollar Economic Zone. “…I think the key element, breakthrough, that I thought for myself that I was making was in the seeing the economy as determined by a combination of two basic macro economic conditions. One is equilibrium in the goods and services market, and equilibrium in the foreign exchange market.”, said Professor Robert A. Mundell at his December 1999 Nobel Prize Reward interview.

“As easily demonstrated in a Mundell-Fleming framework, it is generally not possible for a country to simultaneously enjoy (1) a fixed (or managed) exchange rate, (2) an independent monetary policy, and (3) free international capital mobility.” (Ben S. Bernanke, 2015, p. 11, Federal Reserve Policy in an International Context, Brookings Institution).

While Ducat Economic Zone only has “(2) an independent monetary policy, and (3) free international capital mobility”, Terra Protocol (Luna/TerraUSD) simultaneously had all of “(1) a fixed (or managed) exchange rate, (2) an independent monetary policy, and (3) free international capital mobility.” Terra Protocol (Luna/TerraUSD) completely ignored Mundell-Fleming trilemma model, e.g. the "impossible trinity." For example, TerraUSD had a fixed exchange rate USD:TerraUSD =1:1, its own monetary policy (as high as 20% staking interest rate on Terra’s Anchor Protocol) and free international capital mobility (no restriction for conversion from TerraUSD to USD). However, from March 2022, the Fed raised interest rates substantially while gradually reducing its asset holdings, the existing equilibrium for TerraUSD shifted in US dollar’s favor. Money started moving from TerraUSD economic zone to US dollar economic zone. Because TerraUSD had to maintain 1:1 fixed exchange rate between TerraUSD and US Dollar, money could convert from TerraUSD to US Dollar without exchange rate loss (in contrast to floating exchange rate). Furthermore, because TerraUSD could not purchase goods and services without converting to US dollar, TerraUSD holders had no choice but to convert to US dollar. Therefore, there was no self-stabilization mechanism to bring TerraUSD back to its previous equilibrium, the bank run against TerraUSD could not be stopped once it started, leading to the death spiral of TerraUSD economic zone.

To maintain an equilibrium under a fixed exchange rate between US dollar economic zone and a US dollar pegged stablecoin economic zone, without restricting the capital mobility between the two economic zones, Mundell-Fleming model dictates that the US dollar pegged stablecoin must have the similar monetary policy as the US dollar (staking interest rate cannot be much higher than the interest rate offered by US dollar) and must maintain 100% backup with US dollar or short-term US Treasury Bill. As a result, to maintain a stable equilibrium, a US dollar pegged stablecoin economic zone must be a subset of US dollar economic zone and cannot be an independent of economic zone.

Ducat Economic Zone is independent of US dollar economic zone, because Ducat has a floating exchange rate against US dollar (not fixed exchange rate). Floating exchange rate enables CryptoFed to enjoy freedom of its own monetary policy (interest rate) for money supply, and subsequently fiscal policy (reward to consumers and merchants).

9. How can CryptoFed compete with Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC)?

CBDC belongs to the USD family and carry the same inflation rate as US dollar. The Fed has lost the capacity to adjust interest to control the inflation and deflation, due to the huge debt accumulation in both public and private sectors. Any interest increase by the Fed will further add burdens to interest payments, and any interest decrease by the Fed will add more debt to both public and private sectors. Because the debt will continue accumulating, most of revenues of both public and private sectors will be used for interest payments. As a result, less and less money is available for economic growth. The US dollar economy is on the road toward a slow death of self-destruction.

CBDC is unable to provide the attractive incentives (rewards and interest) to consumers and merchants. In contrast, incentives (rewards and interest) below are the mechanism of Ducat money supply which does not create any debt, while Ducat will appreciate against US dollar over the years following the Target Exchange Rate (TER) which accounts for US dollar inflation.

i) Ducat rewards paid to consumers at range of 5.5% -12% and paid to merchants at range of 1% - 4%.
ii) Ducat interest paid to all Ducat holders at range of 3% - 5%.

Because CryptoFed can establish a virtuous cycle between a "giveaway money supply mechanism" and economic growth, the competitive advantage can last in perpetuity. The virtuous cycle will be further enhanced, because the CryptoFed is open to the general public of Ducat users through the Locke tokens which can be acquired at open crypto exchange markets and can initiate and vote on all governance matters. “While the Board of Governors is an independent government agency, the Federal Reserve Banks are set up like private corporations. Member banks hold stock in the Federal Reserve Banks and earn dividends... Member banks also appoint six of the nine members of each Bank's board of directors,” according to the St. Louis Fed.

10. How can Locke/Ducat model compete with Bitcoin family and Ethereum family?

From an economic perspective, the money supply mechanism of both the Bitcoin family and Ethereum family is an exogenous factor. By design, the Bitcoin family and Ethereum family generate their token money supply independent of the needs of the real-world economy and do not have any mechanism to stabilize their token value against average price of goods and services in the real economy. In contrast, Ducat money supply mechanism is designed for and based on the exact needs of the real economy. As a result, by design, Ducat is a currency to run the real-world economy, while Bitcoin family and Ethereum family are not.
Furthermore, Locke not only has the attribute of a finite number for circulation as Bitcoin does, but also has the underlying Ducat real-world economy to support its value growth. In other words, the Bitcoin family does not have a real-world fundamental economy to support and grow its value as Locke does. In addition, CryptoFed’s EOS Blockchain empowers participants to create their own currency as Ethereum does and will massively expand Ducat-denominated currency family in real economy. It is reasonable to conclude that CryptoFed not only has what the Bitcoin family and Ethereum family have, but also has what they do not have, e.g., the real-world economy.

Through the mining process, the Bitcoin family and Ethereum family put new money into circulation which consumes massive amounts of energy. In contrast, the CryptoFed defines mining broadly as rewards payment for purchase in Ducat, interest payments for holding Ducat, compensation to wallet issuers. From energy consumption perspective, EOS has an overwhelming competitive advantage.  “73.1 TWh / 0.0011 TWh = 66,454 times that EOS is more Energy efficient in comparison to Bitcoin & 17,236 times more Energy efficient than Ethereum.”, per the analysis article
“EOS Energy Consumption vs Bitcoin and Ethereum”